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PRE-TRIAL OF ANTITRUST CONSPIRACY CASES-
THE HOLLAND SAFEGUARD AND JUDICIAL NOTICE
William J. Flittie*
T BIG case" litigation, occurring primarily in the antitrust field,
is a comparatively recent product of our complex commercial
society in which multi-million, and even multi-billion dollar cor-
porations now predominate in many lines of business activity. In
the last decade the problems of pre-trial and trial of these cases have
been the subject of extensive studies designed to reduce the cases to
triable proportions. These efforts resulted in landmarks such as the
Prettyman Report' and the 1957 New York ' and 1958 Palo Alto
seminars,8 though these are but specifically significant documents
among a bibliography that has attained large proportions.! In March
of 1960 this activity culminated in the adoption by the Judicial
Conference of the United States of the Handbook of Recommended
Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases. In the preface of the
book appears a statement of the vexing difficulties with which our
courts are confronted:
Modern American business is big and complex, consequently many of
its controversies are big and complex. But the normal procedure of the
courtroom was designed in simpler times and for simpler disputes. In its
established methods it is unable to cope with the tangled skeins of vast
business conflicts. Such lawsuits involve hundreds-even thousands-of
documents, and thousands-even tens of thousands--of pages of testi-
mony, and weeks and months and even years of trial. The normal course
is ponderous, expensive and time-consuming. But more dangerous is the
burial of relevant, material nuggets of fact in dunes of the irrelevant
or immaterial. Accuracy in the disposition of issues, the supreme aim of
adjudication, becomes more and more difficult.'
* Visiting Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. B.Sc.L., University of
Minnesota; LL.B., Columbia University; formerly Assistant Attorney General, Commissioner
of Labor, State of South Dakota; Attorney for Texaco, Inc.
' Procedure in Anti-trust and Other Protracted Cases, The Prettyman Report, 13 F.R.D.
41, 62 (1951).
'Seminar on Protracted Cases, 21 F.R.D. 395 (1957).
a Seminar on Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. 319 (1958).
' For a selected bibliography on trials of protracted litigation, see 21 F.R.D. 533 (1957).
525 F.R.D. 351 (1960).
' Id. at 359. The Prettyman Report contains actual samples of these problem cases. See
13 F.R.D. at 63. For example, in United States v. New York Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,
67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Ill. 1946), there were 7,000 exhibits and 45,000 pages of testimony.
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A reading of the Handbook indicates substantial unanimity of
agreement that the key to trying protracted cases lies in effective
pre-trial proceedings designed to identify the critical issues and to
limit adversary proving efforts to these issues by order prior to com-
mencement of trial pursuant to rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Among the devices recommended to achieve the delineating of
crucial issues and limiting of proof are: (1) early identification of
a case as a "big case"; (2) its assignment to a single judge for pre-
trial and trial; (3) early assertion of effective control over the case
by that judge; and (4) pre-trial conferences under his supervision
to define the issues to be tried. Ancillary to these conferences, the
judge should require counsel for the parties to submit written or
oral contentions in further elaboration of the pleadings and require
also that efforts to stipulate facts not really in dispute proceed apace.
In addition, effective disclosure of evidence upon which the pro-
ponent of any contention will rely at the trial is essential if real
progress is to be made.' To permit a party the exclusive privilege of
evaluating the evidence allegedly supporting its case-in-chief more
often than not will turn pre-trial proceedings into an empty show,
at least insofar as significant elimination of issues is concerned.
It is the purpose of this Article to explore an area of potential pre-
trial power which possibly can be exercised by the courts in cir-
cumstances where, through intransigence or deviousness of one or
more of the parties, results are not achieved through the process of
contentions, conferences, and stipulations. In order to stay within
'In United States v. Standard Oil Co., Civil No. 11584-C, S.D. Cal., May 12, 1950,
the court required counsel for the plaintiff to file a memorandum containing a description
of the documentary material and oral testimony upon which reliance might be placed at
trial.
It is well settled that a federal district court at pre-trial can compel general disclosure
of documentary evidence, but compelling disclosure of the anticipated testimony of prospec-
tive witnesses is another matter. However, a party can, through the use of discovery proces-
ses and exhaustive inquiry, compel the identification of the other party's witnesses. He then
can take depositions of the witnesses and thereby establish all testimony pertinent to the
issues which the witnesses will give. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), 33. Even where expert wit-
nesses and the privileged work product are involved, disclosure of the existence and content
of such evidence (or at least enough to prove the existence of a genuine issue) can be forced
through the summary judgment procedures, particularly in the partial summary judgment
aspect of these procedures. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Bromley, Judicial Control of Anti-
trust Cases, 23 F.R.D. 417, 424-25 (1958), where the use of partial summary judgment as
a disclosure device is discussed. If it is true that so much disclosure of evidence can be
had "the hard way" through the efforts of one of the parties, it would be strange indeed
that Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(6), which, in broad terms, authorizes the court to consider at pre-
trial "such other matters as may aid in disposition of the action," should be read as more
restrictive on the court than the powers held by the parties. Generally speaking, it should
be a principle of pre-trial procedure that the court for convenience and expedition can com-
pel disclosure of evidence, the gist of which a party might be able to obtain by any method
in advance of trial.
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bounds of reasonable length, the ground to be covered is deliberately
narrowed. This analysis deals mainly with civil cases arising under
the Sherman Act where an injunction is the remedy sought and
where the basic issue is whether there is an agreement (i.e., con-
spiracy) among multiple parties, which agreement, if proved, is
in and of itself a violation of sections 1 or 2 of that Act.' Suggestions
are made showing how the conclusions reached can be carried into
other conspiracy situations under the Sherman Act, even where jury
trials may be involved. However, even if these conclusions apply only
to equity proceedings, their value could be considerable. This is
because civil injunction cases in which the plaintiff seeks an infer-
ence of conspiratorial agreement in the monopolization context of
section 2 of the Sherman Act are, beyond cavil, the most massive
class of lawsuits ever known to the Anglo-American or any other
system of law.
Despite the oft-repeated statement by courts that the objective
in these cases is remedial rather than punitive, it is notorious that the
civil equity cases are more feared by defendants for their punitive
consequences-using the word in its popular rather than technical
equity meaning-than any other type of antitrust suit.' Hence,
when defendants can afford it (by no means is this always the situa-
tion) these cases are litigated with extreme intensity and tenacity.
8 The antitrust conspiracy has its legal basis in sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act,
26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1959):
1. Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade . . .
is declared illegal ...
2. Every person who shall . . . combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize . . . trade or commerce . . . shall be . . . guilty ...
Cases arising under the Sherman Act fall into three main categories:
(1) The relatively rare cases where a single business entity has legally acquired
monopoly power and this power is rendered illegal through acts of
monopolization. The classic example of this type of case is United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (on certifi-
cate from the Supreme Court, 322 U.S. 716 (1944)).
(2) Cases in which there is no real contest as to the existence of an agreement
among multiple parties and the inquiry is primarily concerned with the
purpose and consequences of the agreement. Examples are United States
v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316
U.S. 265 (1942).
(3) Cases in which the inquiry is directed to the existence of an agreement
among business entities with illegality hinging on whether the disputed
agreement is proved. Examples are American Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,
306 U.S. 208 (1939).
It is this third category with which this Article is concerned. The litigation in these cases
is usually civil and on the equity side of the court, since essentially all of the actions are
brought by the United States for injunctions. Not presented in the above categories are the
"attempt" cases which make up a fourth minor category of the Sherman Act situations.




The attitude of defense counsel is that every category of evidence
which the plaintiff has placed in issue must be met with a defense
absolutely exhaustive in content. The loss of the case, in addition to
the unrelished taint of criminal activity, means some degree of loss
of normal business freedom when an adverse decree is entered."
I. THE NATURE OF THE ANTITRUST CONSPIRACY
As in all things, one must come to a place of beginning in order
to undertake an analysis of a problem. Here the place of beginning
necessarily is the extent to which a proponent of an antitrust con-
spiracy will be permitted to present his case-in-chief on an adversary
basis." To the extent that a court permits incompetent, irrelevant,
or immaterial evidence to be introduced, or adversary proof to be
made of what in reality are only neutral business facts, the bed is
made and all that remains is to lie in it.
Antitrust plaintiffs, and particularly the United States with its
enormous resources of investigative and trial personnel, are notoriously
chary of limiting their cases-in-chief. This attitude stems from two
sources. First, there is the "mosaic" concept of proof of an antitrust
conspiracy whereby it is urged that a conspiracy case cannot be
broken into segments and each part viewed separately from the
whole." This view is fair enough so long as pre-trial mechanisms are
developed sufficiently that a court is not, in effect, abdicating control
of the record making process at the trial to the plaintiff. Secondly,
this attitude is born of a desire, not likely to be acknowledged though
evident enough to students of antitrust conspiracy litigation, to con-
struct a record which will aid in circumventing the strictures of the
Sherman Act by the substitution of a test in terms of anti-competi-
tive results rather than the true test of illegal acts.'" This tactic is
" The major meat packing companies have been under the disability of a decree for-
bidding their entry into the retail meat and grocery business since 1920. See United States
v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Ill. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 367 U.S. 909 (1961).
Involved in that case was a consent decree rather than a litigated decree. While it has been
thought by some attorneys that consent decrees are more difficult to modify because of
their contractual aspect, the court repudiated this notion in its decision (189 F. Supp. at
904) and the better view is that there is no distinction. It is extremely difficult to be re-
lieved under either type of decree.
as See The Prettyman Report, supra note 1, at 66, 74.
"z See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962);
United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 544 (1913); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S.
375, 395-96 (1905).
" See Carson, Some Abuses of Antitrust Prosecution: The Investment Bankers Case, 54
Mich. L. Rev. 363 (1956); Dession, supra note 9, at 1034; Rahl, Conspiracy and the
Anti-trust Laws, 44 III. L. Rev. 743, 757 (1950); Note, Conscious Parallelism-Fact or
Fancy? 3 Stan. L. Rev. 679, 684 (1951).
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nothing more than an attempt to enlist the aid of the courts in
expanding the law beyond its content.
The antitrust conspiracy is a conspiracy on the common law
footing. This means that the illegality (which under the Sherman
Act may have either or both criminal and civil consequences on the
same facts and by application of the same substantive law) lies in
the mere banding together of competing business entities through
agreement upon a concerted course of action. There is no necessity
of an additional overt act in pursuance of that agreement."
The illegal act of agreeing may (and because of the sophistication
of modern business defendants usually must) be proved if at all
by circumstantial evidence."1 In the business context an illegal multi-
party agreement will largely, if not entirely, be concerned with
actions which if performed as the individual acts of a single party
are entirely legal."6 Simply stated, a businessman may set his own
prices, but to agree on prices with his competitors per se constitutes
a violation of the Sherman Act, even though the agreement is never
implemented. Thus, there exists the disturbing concept of a con-
spiracy which is punishable although no overt act occurs. This con-
cept was first introduced into our law by the infamous Court of
Star Chamber,1' itself the most repellant memory of our legal system.
However, the doctrine continues to survive even though that court
was abolished more than three centuries ago."'
In fairness it must be said that our courts have not tolerated
extreme applications of this common law concept in the antitrust
field. All of the reported decisions involving antitrust conspiracies
discuss actual anti-competitive acts performed in consequence of
"4 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225 (1940); Nash v. United
States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913). For a history of the development of the common law
conspiracy see Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 393 (1922). This eminent
writer takes the position that the doctrine of illegality without an overt act is an historical
mistake. This mistake has gained substance through uncritical court repetition of lan-
guage found in earlier cases and is a matter to be viewed with much concern because of
the great mischief lurking in its application. He states: "A doctrine so vague in its out-
lines and uncertain in its fundamental nature as criminal conspiracy lends no strength or
glory to the law; it is a veritable quicksand of shifting opinion and ill-considered thought."
Ibid.
The common law standard no longer pertains to most federal criminal conspiracy cases.
The statute of general application, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1959), provides "if two or more persons
conspire .. . and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the con-
spiracy .. " [Emphasis supplied.]
" See Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d 199, 202
(3d Cir. 1961).
" See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93, 106 (6th Cir. 1944), aff'd,
328 U.S. 781 (1946); United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
"' The Poulterers' Case, 9 Co. Rep. 55b, 77 Eng. Rep. 813 (K.B. 1611).
", An Act for Taken [sic] Away the Court Commonly Called the Star Chamber, 1640,
16 Car. 1, c.10, §§ 2, 3.
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the illegal agreements. But in dealing with a type of activity which is
not inherently illegal, it is too easy to make the hiatus of permitting
observed consequences to prove an illegal agreement rather than
insisting that the allegedly concerted actions be the result of a
separately proved agreement."9 Also, the very fact that the common
law conspiracy concept is valid legal theory introduces a degree of
levity into the avenues of proof open to plaintiffs." It is this loose-
ness in the area of proof which in the interests of fairness and
practicality must be curbed.
Justice Jackson, in a much-quoted concurring opinion in Krule-
witch v. United States,2' which is noted for its penetrating analysis
of the plight of a defendant charged with conspiracy, adequately
stated the dilemma of the defendants and the courts in the trial of
conspiracy cases:
' See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939), as an example of
this tendency. Moral certainty of guilt is not a substitute for proving it.
20 Lasky, The Long Bow or Lucretius, Book IV, Line 817, 43 Calif. L. Rev. 596, 601-02
(1955):
1. First, if you are to be the prosecutor or plaintiff's counsel, resolve to deduce
the inference [of conspiracy] from acts, policies, practices and circumstances.
2. Next, survey the particular industry you intend to raid or reform, and
tabulate or catalog all the acts, conduct and characteristics which are found
to be existent in that industry. In this process, put out of your mind the truth
that form follows function.
3. The next step is to frame an allegation in your complaint or indictment to
the effect that there was a general conspiracy, agreement or concert of action
to perform this particular collection of acts and to achieve this particular set
of characteristics.
4. At the trial, diligently prove the existence of this set of facts and charac-
teristics. This ought not be difficult.
5. Behold, you have established that the acts alleged did occur and the charac-
teristics charged did exist. Then string and twang the Long Bow. Ask that a
conspiracy to do the acts be inferred from the fact they were done. Why not?
Is there not a remarkable correlation of fact proved with charge?
The tactics here revealed almost always are in some degree used by the proponents of
the existence of a conspiracy, even though their case is otherwise grounded upon some evi-
dence of real probative force. Such tactics should be short-circuited, thereby revealing with
some clarity whether there really is the basis of a case, and if so, against which defendants.
21 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949). In the course of his concurring opinion Justice Jackson
stated: "In civil [antitrust] proceedings this Court frankly has made the end a test of the
means .. " 336 U.S. at 452. However, he cited in support of this statement the two cases
given as examples in the second category in note 8 supra, where the agreement is not the
real issue but rather its purposes and consequences. Such cases are vastly different from the
category where the very existence of the alleged agreement is the heart of the lawsuit. For
this category of cases Judge Medina in United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y.
1953), accurately stated the proper rule as follows:
[I]t is supposed by some that the requirement of combination is a mere empty
phrase to which one must indeed do lip service, but which may easily be got
around by finding agreement, combination or conspiracy when in truth and in
fact no agreement, combination or conspiracy exists, provided the result ob-
tained seems desirable and in the public interest. This is not the law but only
another aspect of the false but seductive doctrine that the end justifies the
means which, so far as I know, has never taken lodgement in American
jurisprudence; and I hope it never will. 118 F. Supp. at 643.
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When the trial starts, the accused feels the full impact of the con-
spiracy strategy. Strictly, the prosecution should first establish prima
facie the conspiracy and identify the conspirators, after which evi-
dence of acts and deliberations of each in the course of its execution
are admissible against all. But the order of proof of so sprawling a
charge is difficult for a judge to control. As a practical matter, the
accused is confronted with a hodgepodge of acts and statements by
others which he may never have authorized or intended or even known
about, but which help persuade the jury of the existence of the con-
spiracy itself. In other words, a conspiracy often is proved by evidence
that is admissible only upon assumption that [the] conspiracy existed.
This statement was made in the context of a relatively simple fact
situation involving an alleged conspiracy to transport a woman from
New York to Florida for purposes of prostitution. The observation
is a fortiori applicable to antitrust conspiracy cases where efforts are
made to show that normally legal but commercially similar business
practices and policies prove the existence of a conspiracy. Such "boot-
strap" proof becomes a hazard to judges as well as juries in anti-
trust cases where the record reaches such mountainous proportions
as to defy the dispassionate analytical processes of most men, includ-
ing judges.
II. THE HOLLAND SAFEGUARD AS AN ADDITIONAL PRE-TRIAL TOOL
Holland v. United States," a criminal income tax prosecution case,
is important for two principles. First, the Supreme Court accepted
the "net worth" technique of proving taxable income. Second, for
the federal courts, the Court rejected the old common law criminal
standard requiring the prosecution affirmatively to disprove every
reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence when the proof is
based on circumstantial evidence.23 The Court held that it is suf-
ficient if the jury is properly instructed as to the standards of proof
that must be met in reaching its verdict.
However, recognizing the danger which lurks when the prosecu-
tion is permitted to rely upon evidence amounting to no more than
proof of an unexplained increase in a taxpayer's net worth, the
Court placed restrictions upon the use of such evidence. The Court
stated:
22348 U.S. 121 (1954).
2 An example of the old rule in the context of an antitrust conspiracy case is Peveley
Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 942
(1950). The old rule is by no means dead in the state courts. Moreover, the influence of
the old rule is still so strong in the federal courts that it gives rise to an occasional decision
which, although supposedly following the Holland rule, nevertheless seems to import much
of the old rule into it. See Cuthbert v. United States, 278 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1960).
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[C]areful study indicates that it [the net worth theory] is so fraught
with danger for the innocent that the courts must closely scrutinize
its use.24
[T]he taxpayer frequently gives "leads" to the Government agents
... .Were the Government required to run down all such leads it
would face grave investigative difficulties; still its failure to do so
might jeopardize the position of the taxpayer."2
[T]he prosecution may pick and choose from the taxpayer's state-
ment, relying on the favorable portion and throwing aside that which
does not bolster its position."
Trial courts should approach these cases in the full realization that the
taxpayer may be ensnared in a system which, though difficult for the
prosecution to utilize, is equally hard for the defendant to refute ....
Appellate courts should review the cases bearing constantly in mind
the difficulties that arise when circumstantial evidence as to guilt is
the chief weapon of a method that is itself only an approximation."
When the Government rests its case solely on the approximations and
circumstantial inferences of a net worth computation, the cogency
of its proof depends upon its effective negation of reasonable explana-
tions by the taxpayer inconsistent with guilt. . . .When the Govern-
ment fails to show an investigation into the validity of such leads,
the trial judge may consider them as true and the Government's case
insufficient to go to the jury. . . .It is a procedure entirely consistent
with the position long espoused by the Government that its duty is
not to convict but to see that justice is done."
The Holland doctrine, which permits the use of circumstantial
evidence without affirmatively negating every hypothesis of inno-
cence, has been carried into subject areas other than income tax
prosecutions. Presumably the Holland safeguard concerning in-
vestigation of suggested leads accompanies that doctrine. The safe-
guard does apply in civil as well as criminal income tax litigation."'
"
4 Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 125 (1954).
2 5 Id. at 127.
26Id. at 128-29.
2 7 id. at 129.
21 Id. at 135-36. This position "espoused" by the government is not always so freely
championed. It sometimes must be forced upon the government by the courts. See for ex-
ample the following quoted statements in Fortune Magazine, June 1960, p. 257, made by the
then Assistant Attorney General who was Chief of the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice. The statement was made after a trial judge had dismissed an antitrust conspiracy
case at the conclusion of the government's case-in-chief with the comment that the govern-
ment's evidence did not rise above the level of suspicion. The Assistant Attorney General
said: "The oil companies lost this case when the grand jury returned the general indictment.
.. . [W]henever anyone drives into a filling station for a gallon of gasoline, they are bound
to think "those price fixersl"
"
5Harp v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 139, 142 (6th Cir. 1959).
[Vol. 17
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Accordingly, the safeguard should apply to civil as well as criminal
antitrust conspiracy cases. In these antitrust cases, although the
government has the right to seek injunctions and private persons
the right to pursue civil actions for damages, the foundation of these
rights is in a criminal statute, and the indicia of illegality is the same
whether the action is criminal or civil in nature.3°
Is there, in Holland and its safeguarding standard, a basis for pre-
trying the enormous unclassified masses of evidence which the pro-
ponents of an alleged antitrust conspiracy commonly seek to offer
at trial? If there is (1) a course of pre-trial discovery calculated to
give the plaintiff a fair chance to assemble the complete body of
evidence upon which it wishes to rely at trial,31 and (2) a disclosure
of this evidence in relation to the particular allegations or contentions
for which it is offered as proof, it is submitted that a real opportunity
exists.
Under their authority to make pre-trial rulings on questions of
law, the federal district courts can rule in advance on the admissi-
bility of evidence or lines of evidence." In the very analogous areas
of motions to suppress evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure
(in criminal cases) and motions to suppress depositions for irregulari-
ties in their taking (in civil cases), the authority of the courts to
make pre-trial inquiry into the competency, that is, the foundation
or predicate, of evidence likely to be offered at trial is of long
standing.33
This leads to an inquiry concerning the nature of the Holland
safeguard. Is it a foundation standard-hence a matter of com-
petency? Is it concerned with relevance and materiality? Is it con-
cerned with the weight and sufficiency of evidence? Or is it a combi-
nation of some or all of these things? The Supreme Court gave no
indication in its opinion.
3026 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 7 (1959); 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C.
15 (1959).
3' Section 3 of the Antitrust Civil Process Act, 76 Stat. 548 (1962), the Civil Investiga-
tive Demand Statute, has just been passed as of the time of writing. With this power there
should be little need for extensive discovery prior to definitive pre-trial proceedings.
3' See Belknap, Criticisms of the Steckler Outline, 23 F.R.D. 397, 400-01 (1958), and
cases there cited.
""The motion [to suppress evidence on the ground of illegal search and seizure] shall
be made before trial or hearing unless opportunity therefor did not exist .. " Fed. R. Crim.
P. 41(e); see Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838, 845 (8th Cir. 1949); Fed. R. Civ. P.
32(d):
Errors and irregularities in the manner in which the testimony is transcribed
or the deposition is prepared, signed, certified, sealed, indorsed, transmitted,
filed, or otherwise dealt with by the officer [taking it] ... are waived unless
a motion to suppress the deposition or some part thereof is made with reason-
able promptness. . ..
See also Howard v. Stillwell & Bierce Mfg. Co., 139 U.S. 199, 205 (1891).
1963 ]
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Rather plainly, relevance and materiality are not involved, for
evidence can easily meet these tests and yet fall under the ban of
the safeguard for failure to exhaust given leads which may establish
innocence. Overall, the Court seems to be saying that, except when
the safeguard is met, circumstantial evidence tailored solely to proof
of guilt is predicated upon a foundation too hazardous to the objec-
tive of a just decision for admission into a record that will form the
basis for decision. True enough, the Court speaks in terms of
evaluating a completed record to determine if it should be sub-
mitted,"4 but in terms of the test laid down, it would seem well within
the power of the trial judge (and more desirable from the standpoint
of making a record free of fatal error) to keep evidence which can-
not meet the safeguarding standard out of the record as it is made.
It is most unlikely that the Court intended a situation whereby the
trial judge, in his discretion, could permit the proponents to ignore
a reasonable lead and yet submit the case under a mere instruction
concerning weight and sufficiency, for the evil intended to be pre-
vented would thereupon flourish undiminished. The lead permitted
to be ignored might have been that which would have demonstrated
the innocence of the defendant."
So viewed, the Holland safeguard necessarily is a foundation rule
of competency which the trial court is at least entitled, and properly
should in the course of trial, treat as requisite to the offering of
specific circumstantial evidence designed to prove guilt. Otherwise,
there is the possibility of constructing an abortive record containing
a fatal error.
The safeguard should not be avoided by any supposed distinction
between criminal and civil cases. It is true that criminal proof must
be beyond a reasonable doubt; whereas, the civil standard is a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. However, the Holland safeguard can
be equally operative under both standards. Whether the test is
beyond a reasonable doubt or by the preponderance of the evidence,
the failure to exhaust a lead suggestive of innocence is equally destruc-
tive of the objective of a just decision.
There are, of course, certain rather arbitrary rules of inclusion and
exclusion of evidence which differ in criminal and civil cases. For
" Cf. Riggs v. United States, 280 F.2d 949, 954 (5th Cir. 1960).
5 This is not to suggest that a judge is bound to require inquiry into any lead urged
by a defendant. But if a lead is logical and reasonable in the circumstances, it is submitted
that the lead must be exhausted; and where the question is close as to the quality of the
lead urged, the doubt should break in favor of the defendant's position.
80In Harp v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1959), the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals could see no distinction justifying avoidance of the safeguard in a civil case.
[Vol. 17
ANTITRUST PRE-TRIAL TACTICS
example, dying declarations of the victim of a homicide are com-
monly admitted in criminal prosecutions; whereas, the same type
of evidence may not be admissable in a civil case for wrongful
death. Furthermore, the foundation requirements for admission of
a confession in a criminal case are far more stringent than those
for admissions against interest in a civil case. But specific variations
aside, the rules for admission of evidence are otherwise generally the
same. "[I]t is true that the fundamental principles which govern
admissibility of evidence in the one class of cases control in the
other. . . ."" The distinction between the two kinds of cases lies not
in the processes of making the record, but in the degree of proof
required when the record is made."s
If in fact a foundation standard is involved, at most the argu-
ment of those who would avoid the Holland safeguard in civil cases
can rise no higher than a question of which party should have the bur-
den of going forward with evidence. It is conceded that in the usual
civil case involving simpler issues and shorter duration of trial, often
it is reasonable to require defendants to go forward with evidence
involving matters peculiarly within their knowledge, even though
a plaintiff thereby is permitted to avoid strict compliance with rigid
foundation standards. But in the antitrust conspiracy case, where
plaintiffs almost invariably seek to shotgun the record with masses
of unevaluated evidence which may prove no more than like com-
mercial practices that are essential to the very conduct of business,
this usual division of labor in producing evidence becomes precisely
the vice that renders such cases unmanageable. There is no reason
for a trial judge to sit by helplessly and tolerate such a development
in these cases. The Holland safeguard in conjunction with judicial
notice can become the basis for a very effective pre-trial procedure
which will prevent this development. At the same time due regard
is given to an important admonition stated in the following lan-
guage: "[W]e must not make the mistake of isolating each incident
and thus separately denigrating it. Actually all the evidence . . . [is]
" Wharton, 1 Criminal Evidence § 1, at 1, 2 (11th ed. 1935).
" This proposition is well demonstrated by United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 882 (1956). In this case Chief Judge Clark stated as the rule
for the Second Circuit that the trial judge must apply the same test to criminal and civil
trial records in deciding whether to send the cases to the jury, with the only distinction
being in the instruction given the jury on the weight of evidence required for a verdict.
Judge Frank, concurring, enunciated the view that the trial judge should evaluate the record
in terms of reasonable doubt in criminal cases and in terms of preponderance of the evidence
in civil cases in determining whether the case should be submitted to the jury. The latter
rule has found greater favor among the various federal circuit courts. See Riggs v. United
States, 280 F.2d 949, 954-55 (5th Cir. 1960).
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a mosaic, each bit making its own contribution, and all adding up
to a compelling whole. .. .39
The Holland safeguard against unjust conclusions from circum-
stantial evidence is described in terms of the defendant furnishing
leads after which the obligation passes to the proponent of illegality
to exhaust these leads. In antitrust conspiracy cases it would be no
great burden for defendants to furnish leads. But it would be foolish
to render a judge unable to require the leads when he is conducting
pre-trial, particularly when there will be situations where the de-
fendants, like the plaintiffs, are intent upon creating a voluminous
and uncertain record by putting in evidence everything which a
fertile imagination can conceive. Defendants with weak cases do
not wish abbreviated records out of which their wrongdoing stands
with stark intensity. They prefer to immerse such evidence in a
record filled with as many psuedo-issues as possible, so that by a
process of adding rabbits and subtracting horses, they can minimize
and deprecate the damaging evidence. Moreover, there is always a
greater chance of reversible error in a massive and confusing com-
pilation of evidence, rulings, findings, and conclusions.
In no instances are plaintiffs likely to reduce their cases-in-chief,
which trigger the massive responses by defendants, even though it
often would be beneficial to their causes to do so. The scattergun
approach is too ingrained; antitrust plaintiffs pursue their destinies
in the preordained manner of the hero-victims of a Greek tragedy.
Of course, in favor of their methods it must be recognized that
much of the evidence may go to relief if not to violation, and usually
there is but one trial in which to present evidence pertaining to both
violation and relief."'
In such circumstances, the courts and the judicial process become
the victims of the litigants. For this reason a judge at pre-trial should
have the right (though not the obligation) to initiate, expand, and
direct the inquiry which in his judgment is best calculated to elimi-
" United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 283 (2d Cir. 1956); see also cases cited note
12 supra.
" It is suggested that in large civil antitrust cases involving only injunctive relief where
the main issue is the existence of an alleged conspiracy, the question of relief to be obtained
usually should be tried separately from and subsequent to issues of violation. This will
greatly reduce the size of record at the violation trial and tend to keep evidence proffered
by the parties to proper categories of probative value. Where no violation is found, the
litigation is at end. Where a violation has been found it scarcely is to be supposed that
admission of evidence of usual business methods and policies will be attended by any de-
termined effort to keep it out on the part of defendants. Indeed, it reasonably might be
supposed that revealed conspirators will prove most cooperative in equipping the court to
frame its injunctive decree. It is not human nature to antagonize the "sentencing" judge.
The Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D.
351, 403 (1960), recognizes the possibility of separate trials.
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nate matters not properly in issue because of inability to lay the
requisite foundation.4' The objective in a lawsuit is a sound decision
on the evidence that is admissible, not an ordeal extended to in-
terminable length at the whim of counsel. Any legitimate machinery
which will aid in attaining this end should be put in motion by
the court in big cases where counsel are either inept or refrain from
excising extraneous issues for reasons of strategy.
There are two basic categories of evidence which should be tested
under the Holland safeguard at the pre-trial of an antitrust con-
spiracy case and appropriately dealt with in the pre-trial order.
The first, and far the largest category, is evidence dealing with
more-or-less identical business practices followed by the defendants.
Here the "lead" which gives rise to inquiry would be a suggestion
that the parallel behavior is -no more than a reasonable response to
business problems." It then would be incumbent upon the proponent
of the evidence to show the possession of presumptively admissible
evidence carrying some taint of illegality before adversary proof
of the particular line of evidence would be permitted.43 It is not
overlooked that the completed record yet must disclose many busi-
ness practices which, though essentially neutral in probative effect,
are needed to flesh out and make meaningful the whole picture.
Where necessary, this evidence should be brought into the record
through judicial notice, which is discussed below.
41 In the Prettyman Report, supra note 1, at 75-76, the suggestion is made for protracted
litigation that in reversal of normal procedures where the burden arises only upon valid
objection, the proponent of evidence at trial should have the complete affirmative burden of
showing competency, relevancy, and materiality prior to the offering of evidence. No reason
can be perceived why, after the positions of the parties are reasonably developed by discovery,
these same inquiries cannot be made at pre-trial. Certainly this is a less drastic process of
identifying an issue for adversary trial than for the court simply to state the issues to be
tried upon failure of the parties to agree, as occurred in Life Music, Inc. v. Broadcast Music,
Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (1962 Trade Cas.) 5 75412 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 1962).
4" See Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 177 F. Supp. 743,
746-47 (N.D. Cal. 1959):
In deciding whether evidence of defendants' conduct can reasonably support
an inference of conspiracy, there must be more than mere general similarities;
there must be a sameness of conduct under circumstances which logically sug-
gest joint agreement, as distinguished from individual action. Proof of parallel
business conduct is not a substitute for proof of conspiracy, and similar con-
duct, as such, does not establish conspiracy. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Para-
mount, 1954, 346 U. S. 537, 74 S. Ct. 275, 98 L. Ed. 273. As stated in
United States v. Borden Co., D.C.N.D. Ill. 1953, 111 F. Supp. 562, 579: "Rea-
sonable businessmen will act similarly when presented with the same problem."
The antitrust laws were not meant to prohibit businessmen from adopting
sound business policies merely because competitors had already adopted the
same or a similar policy." (Emphasis supplied.)
" Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws
39 (1955) suggests factors to be considered in evaluating whether parallel behavior may be
tainted. See also Dession, supra note 9, at 1048.
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The second category of evidence concerns allegations of a scientific
or technical nature which the plaintiff demonstrably is unable to
prove with competent evidence. Though these situations will be rare,
a plaintiff never should be permitted to draw such issues into the
trial by a proffer of circumstantial evidence which does not include
expert witnesses prima facie qualified and able to support the sci-
entific or technical findings of fact which plaintiff seeks. This is not
to say that a plaintiff must prove a phase of its case at pre-trial; it
is intended only that plaintiff must show that it is prima facie pre-
pared to carry the burden of proof which the law requires. Where
a plaintiff cannot make this minimal showing, the court's pre-trial
order should exclude from the trial all evidence relating to such
issues. It is difficult to imagine a more complete lack of foundation,
or a greater imposition upon the courts, than when a plaintiff is
unable to proceed in a scientific or technical area with qualified
witnesses who have studied the challenged practices and are prepared
to testify in support of plaintiff's allegations."
III. JUDICIAL NOTICE
Pre-trial proceedings offer peculiar opportunities for a judicious appli-
cation of judicial notice. Its employment under proper safeguards . . .
will speed . . . the elimination of issues as to which there is or can
be no bona fide dispute."
[l]t is an instrument of great capacity in the hands of a competent
judge; and is not nearly as much used, in the region of practice and
evidence, as it should be. . . . [T]he failure to exercise it tends daily
to smother trials with technicality, and monstrously lengthen them
OUt.
46
[A] large field opens for reducing the tedious proof of notorious facts.
The principle is an instrument of a usefulness hitherto unimagined by
judges. Let them make liberal use of it; and thus avoid much of the
needless failures of justice that are caused by the artificial impotence
of judicial proceedings. 4
"It will be borne in mind that we assume here a situation where the route of direct
evidence of a conspiracy is not available; hence, the existence of the conspiracy depends
upon inferences from circumstantial evidence. Failure of a plaintiff, and particularly the
United States with its investigative resources, to be prepared to substantiate scientific and
technical claims with competent expert testimony should result in a pre-trial order exclud-
ing circumstantial evidence of whatever nature (in that particular area) from the trial.
This is not harsh. It is simply a reasonable requirement that the proponent of a proposition
present its case in terms of the best evidence which can be prepared. Failure properly to
prepare an issue should not be rewarded by permitting introduction of secondary evidence
which, unless the defendant chooses to go forward with opposing evidence it has no obliga-
tion to supply, leaves the court in a position where the plaintiff is asking it to speculate
toward a conclusion that could as readily be wrong as right.
45Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 269, 294 (1944).
40 Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 309 (1898).
479 Wigmore, Evidence S 2583, at 585 (3d ed. 1940).
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Despite these statements by the great commentators on the law
of evidence-which have been reiterated over a span of more than
half a century without appearance of a major dissent-judicial notice
has not fulfilled its potentiality for expediting trials. Particularly it
has been little used in pre-trial proceedings, where lies the only real
opportunity to plan and shorten the trial of cases. Likely, this failure
is in part traceable to our tradition of fully adversary trial pro-
ceedings, but also it is probably traceable to the lack of development
in our judicial processes of a "trigger" at the pre-trial stage for the
consideration of various lines of proof in terms of judicial notice.
Whether raised at the suggestion of the defendants, at the direc-
tion of the court, or more or less spontaneously in the give-and-take
of pre-trial conferences concerned with identifying and narrowing
the issues, application of the Holland safeguard in pre-trial necessarily
supposes an examination under the supervision of the court of the
contentions and their supporting lines of evidence. Inevitably in
hearing a plaintiff's arguments in justification of proposed proof,
and the defendants' counter-arguments, a judge conducting pre-trial
will come to have a more complete understanding of a particular
subject matter than he ever could hope to attain at an adversary trial
or through his independent study of the subject. In brief, though his
personal knowledge originally does not encompass the details of
policies and methods under which a type of business is operated, he
will become well instructed. 8 This should be an eminently satisfac-
tory means of preparing the court to take judicial notice.
In some situations a plaintiff will be unable to show that an other-
wise normal type of business or technical practice is tainted with
the "something more" specifically suggestive of illegality. In these
instances there is no good reason why evidence of such practices
should swell the record by presentation on an adversary basis. More-
over, even where there is such a taint, adversary trial should be con-
fined to the narrower area of that evidence which bears the taint.
Application of the Holland safeguard, in addition to performing
the office of allowing pre-trial inquiry into the foundation admissi-
bility of evidence, also can trigger a pre-trial method for identifying
the wheat of controversy and the chaff of background. Upon such
identification, judicial notice then can provide the means for bringing
the latter into the record on a non-adversary basis.
Except for human nature, of which attorneys partake in ample
degree, stipulations would seem the ideal instrument with which to
accomplish this. But anyone who has gone through the process of
48 Id. at § 2568a, at 537.
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attempting stipulations in a major antitrust conspiracy case knows
that the prospect often is approached in a fashion reminiscent of the
minimal "name, rank, and serial number" declaration of a prisoner
of war-an attitude that bodes ill for much success. Also, in the
final analysis, a court cannot compel stipulations.
This should not be surprising. Under our system of law, adversary
counsel inevitably view themselves as the legal champions of their
clients. Their chief motivation is victory. They are aware that they
deal with intelligent men on the other side who have the same
motivation. They can speculate but never know with certainty how
a particular stipulation will be urged by the opponent or interpreted
by the court; but they do know that they are bound by it for all
purposes not clearly delimited by the stipulation itself. Furthermore,
they are well aware that it is possible to stipulate one's self into an
adverse finding of fact. Few counsel are prepared to risk the ire of
clients, including superiors in the Department of Justice, with over-
generous stipulations that may turn around and bite. Because of the
conclusory nuances almost inevitable in any language application,
the very problem of wording stipulations, even in relatively un-
important matters, becomes a real hurdle.
It is not suggested that aggressive efforts to obtain stipulations be
abandoned as a pre-trial device. To the extent they are obtainable,
they are the simplest of the record-making methods. But realistically,
their limitations must be faced, including a realization that the more
nebulous or avant-garde the plaintiff's theory of its case, the less the
chance of obtaining them.
At this point, a judge at pre-trial, through judicial notice, can
continue to flesh out the record after the stipulation process is dead-
locked." Because the notice taken will be in the words of the court,
many fears inherent in the stipulation process will not be roused.
Moreover, judicial notice based on erroneous understanding is subject
to correction by the appellate court, which can investigate and take
its own judicial notice in lieu of that taken by the trial court."
Generally, in indicating the matters of which he will take judicial
notice, a judge should limit himself to areas where there is no basis
for real controversy in the matter noticed. Beyond this, he should
make clear in the pre-trial order that the court will permit the notice
"" The range in which a particular judge will use judicial notice is discretionary with
him. It is settled that courts may notice much they cannot be compelled to notice by gen-
eral rule. Id. at § 2583, at 581. This is simply to say that in an area where he could take
judicial notice, an individual judge may nevertheless require formal proof if he considers it
best in the particular cvidentiary situation with which he is confronted.
5°1d. at § 2567, at 536.
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taken to be controverted by the parties but only to the extent that
evidence of a relevant and material nature is produced against it. This
will permit a larger scope of judicial notice without risk of reversible
51
error.
The very nature of pre-trial inquiry under the Holland safeguard
makes it certain that the parties will have ample opportunity to
produce materials and participate in the instruction of the court prior
to the taking of judicial notice. At the conclusion of the process, the
court should then advise the parties by pre-trial order of all matters
of which judicial notice will be taken and prohibit introduction of
evidence at trial which has only the effect of proving the existence
of the practices already noticed.
It must be conceded that precedent for noticing business practice
is virtually nil. The case development over the years, however, shows
an increasingly liberal attitude on the part of the courts. When
compared to some of the other matters of which judicial notice has
been taken, there is nothing startling in the idea of noticing usual
practices of established businesses."2
In the final analysis, judicial notice is the only device available
whereby, after having stripped a complex case to its essential dis-
puted issues in advance of trial, a court can yet produce an overall
record that is adequate and intelligible for appellate use even though
counsel are unable or unwilling to stipulate.
s Controversy exists as to whether a party can present disputing evidence when judicial
notice has been taken. Wigmore says yes. Id. at § 2567, at 535. Morgan, no. Morgan, supra
note 45. It would seem that the safer rule, and the one most likely to avoid reversible error,
is to permit controverting evidence to be offered. However, it should be strictly limited to
evidence tending to modify or deny the notice taken. To the extent the court is in error in
the notice taken, it then will have an opportunity to adjust in the findings of fact finally
made. Care should be taken that such further proof is not permitted to become a backdoor
for circumventing the intended precluding effect of judicial notice upon masses of prospec-
tive evidence which are consistent with the notice taken.
" The cases noted in Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 47, at S 2580 (including pocket sup-
plement) show this development. While most are routine notices of matters of history,
geography, law, etc., they also show judicial notice being taken (I) of such things as hos-
pital and institutional costs in relation to the ability of people to pay for them, (2) that
certain types of irrigation projects are successful crop producers, (3) that alcoholism is a
form of sickness, (4) that present day supermarkets are like small department stores, and
(5) that the machinations of the Communist Party are elaborate and its objectives destruc-
tive. In Kuntz, Oil and Gas Law § 2.3, at 62 (1962), are shown a number of instances of
judicial notice taken in matters concerned with the oil and gas industry including such de-
tails as the usual form of leasing arrangements. The court in United States v. Utah Phar-
maceutical Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 29 (D. Utah 1962), said it could take notice of matters so
complex as usual matters concerned with the profession of pharmacy. In light of cases like
these, it would seem that to take judicial notice of such things as methods of distribution
and sale, pricing policies, manufacturing methods, usual practices in procurement of raw
materials, etc., should be permissible if the judge of a court wishes to undertake to inform
himself of such things. For an outstanding article urging broad and liberal use of judicial
notice, see Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 944 (1955).
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IV. A THEORETICAL APPLICATION OF THE
PROPOSALS TO AN ACTUAL CASE
United States v. Standard Oil Co.," the so-called West Coast case,
was a civil antitrust action brought by the United States against the
seven major integrated oil companies operating in the far west and
the Conservation Committee of California Oil Producers. The latter
was an industry-supported association that recommended what pur-
ported to be maximum efficient rates of oil production to California
producers of crude petroleum. Suit was filed on May 12, 1950, and
continued on a very active pre-trial basis until nearly March 7, 1961,
when the last remaining oil company defendant was dismissed by
stipulation. During this eleven year period, the Conservation Com-
mittee won a dismissal on October 24, 1958, on the ground that the
case had become moot as to it, though the issues involving its activi-
ties were retained in the case. On June 19, 1959, a consent decree
was entered which removed the other six oil company defendants
from the case.
As brought, the case charged an overall conspiracy involving all
facets of the western petroleum industry-production, transporta-
tion, refining, and marketing-based on activities in the period from
January of 1936 to May of 1950. In essence it was a monopolization
case under section 2 of the Sherman Act with illegality hinging on
whether or not the requisite conspiracy among the defendants could
be established. Proof of the alleged illegality depended entirely upon
inferences to be drawn from circumstantial evidence. In short, it was
exactly the type of case under discussion in this Article.
Approximately 3,000 documents were identified by the United
States for possible introduction at trial, as well as the summaries of
testimony of scores of witnesses. This, however, does not convey a
full sense of the immensity of the government's prospective proffer
of evidence. Many of the documentary exhibits were merely sum-
maries of masses of other documentary materials not proposed to be
offered by the plaintiff but very much in issue if the summary docu-
ments were admitted as proof. Also, the individual documents often
were writings of great length and complexity. Suffice it to say that
there was general agreement that had the case gone to trial, it easily
could have developed into the largest single piece of litigation ever
tried in any court.
More than half of the United States' case-in-chief consisted of
evidence purporting to show that the producing recommendations
"Civil No. 11584-C, S.D. Cal., May 12, 1950; see discussion note 7 supra.
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of the Conservation Committee in the post-World War II period,
though ostensibly and in form based on petroleum reservoir engi-
neering,54 were in fact but a mask for a continuing surreptitious effort
to restrict supply to demand. In support of this allegation, the
government offered no direct evidence, amazing though it is that
such a conspiracy participated in by hundreds of persons over a
period of years could have been hidden, if it in fact existed. Reliance
was placed on some equivocal statements culled from documents
which concerned production recommendations in about eighty oil
pools. By statistical studies more than 400 oil pools also were in-
volved. Late in the pre-trial proceedings the United States offered
to restrict its case involving specific reservoirs to seven pools selected
by it; however, at no time was any offer made to excise the overall
statistical studies. Hence all pools remained in issue.
Though it cannot be imagined that the court ever would have
permitted full scale trial of the production issue posed by the gov-
ernment, at all times the defendants were confronted with the need
to prepare a defense for all pools involved. Even with a most opti-
mistic estimate of one week per pool for presenting an engineering
pool study and allowing cross-examination, a trial of astronomical
proportions was theoretically possible. Of course, as a practical
matter, preparing the indicated defense while the case remained in
this posture was not feasible.
Pleadings and contentions of the plaintiff in this phase of its case
were couched in unmistakably technical terms of a deliberate abuse
of proper reservoir engineering standards. Yet on full disclosure of
its prospective case-in-chief the government did not indicate one
shred of prospective testimony by a qualified petroleum reservoir
engineer in support of these claims. In fact it was an open secret
among counsel connected with the case that the challenged producing
rates had not been studied on the government side by a petroleum
reservoir engineer unless casually by a person who was unconnected
with the government personnel assigned to the case and who would
not be called to testify.
5' Petroleum reservoir engineering is a complex science involving physical responses of
oil and reservoirs to controls and production practices in which the most important con-
servation tool is restriction of producing rates to what is called the maximum efficiency
rate. Production in excess of this rate can be extremely wasteful, because it permits inefficient
energy mechanisms to supplant slower but much more efficient mechanisms. A.I.M.E., Petro-
leum Conservation (1951); Report of the Attorney General Pursuant to Section 2 of the
Joint Resolution of July 28, 1955, Consenting to an Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil
and Gas 14-21 (1956). The government's counsel did not attack the principle of maxi-
mum efficient rates. Pre-trial Transcript, p. 325, United States v. Standard Oil Co. supra
note 53. In the consent decree plaintiff expressly accepted this principle and its continued
application by the Conservation Committee or any successor organization.
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In such circumstances under the procedures proposed in this
Article, the suggestion would be made by the defendants at pre-trial
that investigation of the challenged producing rates would demon-
strate that they were bona fide engineering applications. The court
would then take judicial notice that there is a recognized science of
reservoir engineering whereby petroleum reservoirs are controlled in
the interests of increased ultimate recovery. Such notice would cast
on plaintiff the burden of showing that it would present pool studies
through a prima facie qualified expert or experts which would fairly
put the matter in issue. Upon failure to demonstrate the capacity
to do this, plaintiff, for revealed inability to carry its burden of
proof, would be precluded by pre-trial order from offering any evi-
dence whatever going to this phase of its case.
Few of the monopolization through conspiracy cases will contain
significant scientific and technical issues. But of non-technical busi-
ness practices the same cannot be said. Every one of these cases will
contain a plentitude of efforts to prove conspiracy by comparable
business activities, even though most of such vastly time-consuming
tactics are without real probative effect.
In the case under consideration there was a great deal of such
evidence. For example, according to its submitted contentions55 plain-
tiff sought to prove that the defendant oil companies owned and
used most of the pipelines and other transportation facilities in the
West, and in toto, the defendants did in fact own and use most of
them. Plaintiff sought to prove that defendants engaged in crude oil
and product exchanges on a large scale-and so they did. Plaintiff
sought to prove that the defendants had acquired refineries thereto-
fore owned by small refiners-and some of them had made such
acquisitions. And so on with no suggestion in the prospective evi-
dence that there was an agreement in such areas, unless gratuitous
aggregation by a plaintiff has become a synonym for agreement.
Throughout such contentions, in addition to constant conclusory
editorial comment, ran this refrain, pertaining here to the exchange
agreements:
Plaintiff does not claim that there has been any express agreement
among defendants that they would enter into exchange agreements
between or among themselves as above set forth, or that they would
refuse exchange agreements with independent refiners unless there was
a direct and substantial benefit to a defendant. Plaintiff does contend
that the acts of defendants above described constitute acts in further-
ance of the combination and conspiracy to suppress and eliminate
" Outline of Plaintiff's Contentions, Jan. 10, 1957, United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
Civil No. 11584-C, S.D. Cal., May 12, 1950.
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competition among and between themselves and with independent
refiners in the production and purchase of crude oil and the refining of
petroleum products, and have been acts promoting and extending
defendants' monopoly control over crude oil production and purchase,
and the refining and marketing of petroleum products. Plaintiff claims
that said acts were a part of the conspiracy and monopolization
charged."
Fair enough. Such practices would have considerable bearing on the
question of relief if the conspiratorial agreement were proved. But
now the tour de force. Despite opening disclaimer by the plaintiff's
counsel that such evidence could be used to prove the conspiracy,
look where he ended a few hundred words later, without interruption
and without stopping. Surely this following display will convince
the reader of the need to eliminate from adversary proof evidence
lacking in real probative value and to get industrial background evi-
dence into the record on a non-adversary basis.
Now, I don't know that in the order of proof the plaintiff would first
introduce proof as to all matters set forth under Part VI and Part VII
[categories of evidence which, in plaintiff's view did prove the con-
spiracy"7] before it introduced any matters under Part VIII [the cate-
gory related to the contentions just described which did not, presum-
ably, tend to prove the conspiracy]. But plaintiff does contend, and
it will present evidence from which we will ask the court to find,
that there was a definite agreement among the defendants to suppress
and eliminate competition among themselves and with the others by
the operation of the two-pronged program originating in 1936, and
we will ask the court to infer or to find from that that the defendants
did agree among themselves to suppress and eliminate competition
among themselves and with others by means of the two programs
which we have set forth in Part VI and Part VII.
Now it has been our contention that, having established that there
was a conspiracy among these companies . . . we contend that when
each . . . follows a course . . . in promotion of the same objectives . . .
the acts which are performed individually which may help to prove
the extent of the monopolization should be considered by the court also
in determining the scope . . . of the conspiracy. . . . [T]hese activi-
ties . . . become acts in furtherance of that conspiracy and help explain
the scope of the conspiracy.
Therefore, acts of the nature which we have specified become acts,
we contend, in furtherance of that conspiracy and from the perform-
ance of those acts we will ask the court to infer that there was an
soId. at 1.
5 It is the opinion of the writer that the plaintiff included much evidence in categories
claimed to be probative of the conspiracy that will not bear analysis. However, at this




agreement among the defendants that they would perform those acts
because they were acts in furtherance of the conspiracy and become a
part of the conspiracy.58 (Emphasis supplied.)
In such cases involving like business practices, upon the suggestion
at pre-trial that investigation of a practice indicated by a line of evi-
dence would indicate no more than similar solutions of like problems,
the court would conduct an inquiry with counsel to ascertain if
this appeared to be a reasonable assertion. If so, plaintiff would be
asked to designate evidence in that very category of practice tending
to show prima facie the taint of agreement among the defendants.
If unable, the court's pre-trial order would ban introduction of
evidence concerning such practice at trial. However, if evidence of
the existence of such practice were helpful or essential to the overall
record, it would be judicially noticed.
In situations where plaintiff is able to show prima facie tainting
evidence of an illegal practice, the pre-trial order would judicially
notice the existence of the business practice. Then at trial the court
would limit adversary proof to evidence of that category of practice
which is tainted with a "something more" tending to suggest the
existence of a conspiratorial agreement over and beyond the mere
existence of the business practice. In the process of deciding whether
a possible taint exists, a court should be liberal in considering the
urgings of the plaintiff, though by no means abdicating the determi-
nation to it.
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The propositions advanced in this Article are not to be in sub-
stitution of other pre-trial procedures but in addition to them. Their
greatest value may prove to be as powers in reserve rather than
instruments in actual use.
Where needed, in addition to shortening a trial, they would strip
a case-in-chief down to where an innocent defendant could hope
for summary judgment and be relieved of the expense and hazard
of trial. It is no secret in the antitrust bar that a plaintiff occasionally
will name as defendant in claimed conspiratorial monopolizations a
business entity against which there is no real case. As an aid to dis-
covery, pleading in this manner is perhaps justifiable,"9 but when dis-
covery fails to disclose evidence of culpable activities, that defendant
58 Pre-Trial Transcript at 498-501, United States v. Standard Oil Co., Civil No. 11584-C,
S.D. Cal., May 12, 1950.
sI This reason becomes less supportable with passage of the Civil Investigative Demand
Statute. See discussion in note 31 supra.
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nevertheless is usually retained in the case. A monopolization charge
is rendered more than slightly ridiculous if a business entity serving
a substantial portion of a relevant market is acknowledged to be a
wholly independent competitor.
Without recourse to the suggested procedures, a defendant is locked
into a case by the unevaluated evidence of the same types of busi-
ness practices in which it did engage in common with other de-
fendants. Where evaluation of the evidence at pre-trial shows, as to
that defendant, no participation in practices sufficiently tainted to
justify adversary proof, it is only fair that that defendant be spared
the ordeal of trial-even if the plaintiff must reduce its charge to less
than monopolization, thereby foregoing considerable sex appeal and,
ab initio, putting itself in line for much less in the way of relief.6"
This Article deliberately has been limited to antitrust conspiracy
cases where an injunction is sought, for here there is no possibility
of jury trial. However, to the extent that the parties waive jury trial,
the suggested procedures should be equally available in other civil
litigation involving at its heart the alleged existence of a conspiracy.
Even where a jury trial is not waived, there would seem to be no
hurdle apart from some inherent clumsiness preventing judges from
advising juries of matters of which judicial notice is to be taken
pursuant to pre-trial determinations. 1 Such advice can even take
the form of relating the judicial notice to the jury from time to time
in advance of the lines of proof concerning particular activities.
This would be of considerable aid to the jury in maintaining con-
textual association throughout a long trial.
Criminal antitrust conspiracy cases, in addition to being jury cases,
are subject to the procedural infirmity of inability to compel general
disclosure of the evidence on which the government will rely to
establish its case-in-chief.2 Thus, to the extent a "dog-in-the-manger"
6 Some idea of the benefits which could flow to an innocent defendant who otherwise
might become the victim of massed evidence brought against massed defendants can be
gained from a recent article. McDonald, The Effective Use of Summary Judgment, 15 Sw.
L.J. 365 (1961). See also Gold Fuel Serv. Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 306 F.2d 61 (3d
Cir. 1962).
O Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 47, at § 2567, at 535-36, seems to recognize the pos-
sibility of judicial notice communicated by the court to the jury in jury cases. In ALI Code
of Evidence rule 805 (1942), one finds a provision for instructing juries as to matters
judicially noticed by courts.
" Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 permits defendants to inspect and copy documents obtained by
the government from a defendant or others by subpoena upon a showing that the docu-
ments are material and the request is reasonable. Rule 17(c) permits both the government
and the defendants to issue subpoenas to each other and third parties for the production
of documents for examination prior to trial. However, this is not a counterpart to the dis-
covery under the federal civil procedure rules, where under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(6) it is
believed a plaintiff can be compelled to disclose the entire spectrum of evidence upon which
reliance will be placed. See note 7 supra.
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attitude prevails, there is no hope of launching the inquiries here
suggested, for this procedure depends on the entire contents of a
category of evidence being laid before the court for pre-trial con-
sideration. This is unfortunate, for the theory and content of both
types of cases are the same; only the requisite weight of proof varies.
But it must be faced that apart from acquiescence in the procedure,
it is not possible in a criminal case to launch pre-trial inquiry from
the springboard of the Holland safeguard, though that very safe-
guard was enunciated in criminal litigation.
